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Abstract 
The paper advocates for changes to normative aspects of belief management in 
applied research. The central push is to argue for methodologically-required choice to 
include the possibility of adopting the view that a given dataset contains insufficient 
regularities for predictive theorising. This is argued to be related to how we should 
understand differences between predictive and non-predictive knowledges, 
contrasting Crombie and Nesbit. The proposed direction may also support 
management practices under conditions of uncertainty.  
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Introduction 
Just what is confirmation bias: belief in belief 
The phrase ‘confirmation bias’ is well-known to scholars. It is usually taken to mean 
the presence of a bias in interpretation of data that encourages support for pre-existing 
knowledge. The most-cited work containing the phrase in its title is Nickerson 1998:1  
As the term is used in this article and, I believe, generally by psychologists, confirmation bias 
connotes a less explicit, less consciously one-sided case-building process. It refers usually to 
unwitting selectivity in the acquisition and use of evidence [175] 
Further, he reports that: 
Studies of social judgment provide evidence that people tend to overweight positive confirmatory 
evidence or underweight negative discomfirmatory evidence [180] 
And that:  
People sometimes see in data the patterns for which they are looking, regardless of whether the 
patterns are really there [181] 
This raises, for some, the question as to why people ‘see things that are not really 
there’,2 which suggests, surely, that we should at least consider that beliefs we could 
label as superstition, or religious, are present. We can note from this Gillespie 2008 
                                                 
1 The metric used is from Harzing’s Publish or Perish, which uses Google Scholar, and reported 
(25/3/2015) 1749 citations. Second was Mynatt et al 1977 with only 391.  
2 Thus Caballero 2010 treats such tendencies as an example of ‘pareidolia’, the familiar situation where 
the mind sees patterns (such as faces in clouds) that do not actually exist.   
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who argues that the modern secular world is far more influenced by its religious past 
than is perhaps thought:  
[T]he apparent rejection or disappearance of religion or theology in fact conceals the continuing 
relevance of theological issues and commitments for the modern age. . . .  [T]he process of 
secularisation or disenchantment that has come to be seen as identical with modernity was in fact 
something different than it seemed . . .  the gradual transference of divine attributes to human 
beings (an infinite human will), the natural world (universal mechanical causality), social forces 
(the general will, the hidden hand), and history (the idea of progress) [272–273, emphasis added] 
What actually occurs in the course of modernity is thus not simply the erasure or disappearance of 
God but the transference of his attributes, essential powers, and capacities to other entities or realms 
of being. The so-called process of disenchantment is thus also a process of reenchantment in and 
through which both man and nature are infused with a number of attributes or powers previously 
ascribed to God. To put the matter more starkly, in the face of the long drawn out death of God, 
science can provide a coherent account of the whole only by making man or nature or both in some 
sense divine. [274] 
This is suggestive. It may be useful to consider that confirmation bias, viewed from a 
distance, reflects a culturally-specific ‘belief in belief’ explicable in terms such as 
belief in revelatory knowledge, in the very validity of searches for truth, etc. This is 
not to say that before Christianity everyone was a sceptic, but to suggest that 
confirmation bias (and here there is of course a vast literature) can be thought of as a 
belief that what is believed happens to be true, in some sense.  
The bias, at the level of the individual, is towards confirming existing beliefs; at the 
social level, it supports shared beliefs that there is a knowable order, some specific 
knowledge of which is then to be confirmed. Consider Cohen 1984:  
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What is wrong with NHST [Null Hypothesis Significance Testing – AJF]? Well, among other 
things, it does not tell us what we want to know, and we so much want to know what we want to 
know that, out of desperation, we nevertheless believe that it does! What we want to know is, 
“Given these data, what is the probability that H0 (the Null Hypothesis – AF) is true?” But as most 
of us know, what it tells us is “Given H0 is true, what is the probability of these (or more extreme) 
data?” These are not the same, as has been pointed out many times over the years. [997] 
That what is taught in basic statistical courses – here the assumptions required for 
application of Hypothesis-testing methods - should so often be ignored arguably 
reflects the social value attached to confirmation of belief that there is a knowable 
order: a bias against judgement that it is better to assume unknowability in that 
particular context, or, to put it more strongly, that social knowledge production should 
be able to argue that we know, here, that there is an unknowable unknown, and that 
we act accordingly.3 This bias can be dangerous. Reference could be made here to 
Keynes’ discussion of uninsurable risk, which is not a matter of uncertainty, but of a 
view that ‘here’ we know that we do not know. This is not to take a philosophical 
view that, in general, we ‘cannot know truth’, but to seek and validate procedures that 
allow us to form and defend such views.   The point of this paper is to provide an 
analysis of research method that then leads it to make proposals for changes in 
                                                 
3 Thus the American Statistical Association in March 2016 felt driven to release a statement on p-
values and their misinterpretation (ASA 2016): ““Over time it appears the p-value has become a 
gatekeeper for whether work is publishable, at least in some fields,” said Jessica Utts, ASA president. 
“This apparent editorial bias leads to the ‘file-drawer effect,’ in which research with statistically 
significant outcomes are much more likely to get published, while other work that might well be just as 
important scientifically is never seen in print.”” [1]..  
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method, that come down to a procedural requirement that permits (and so also rejects) 
statements that ‘here, we know that the unknown is unknowable’.  
If knowability is associated with knowable cause-effect relations, then consider the 
design of structures facing risk of repeated stress leading to cracks that propagate fast 
or slowly, with high speeds of crack propagation being experienced as dangerous. It 
turns out that the social construction of knowledge that allows aeroplanes to be 
design, manufactured, sold and operated with reasonable levels of insurance relies 
upon predictive knowledge where no theory explains and predicts propagation speed:  
Aircraft fuselage structure is a good example of structure that is based largely on a slow crack 
growth rate design. … 
The rate of fatigue crack propagation is determined by subjecting fatigue-cracked specimens, like 
the compact specimen used in fracture toughness testing, to constant-amplitude cyclic loading. The 
incremental increase in crack length is recorded along with the corresponding number of elapsed 
load cycles acquire stress intensity (K), crack length (a), and cycle count (N) data during the test. 
[NDT Resource Center 2013] 
In such situations ‘confirmation bias’- if understood in terms of some theorised 
understanding - cannot operate. Such a bias seeks to defend belief in some knowable 
order, with order understood in terms of some theory expressed in cause-effect terms. 
Interestingly, in this example the social construction of knowledge does not extend to 
the social construction of an analytical knowledge in the sense of a theory or model 
that so articulates a cause-effect logic that it can be used to make predictions. Science 
here argues that whilst we know what will happen, so far we know that we knowably 
do not know, in terms of a logical model, why. Some find this surprising.  
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But what criteria make such theories acceptable? As an example, we find, in the 
widely-cited Held et al 1999 the question asked – “What is globalisation and how 
should it be conceptualised?”. Their particular criteria are:  
“… any satisfactory account of globalization has to offer: a coherent conceptualisation; a justified 
account of causal logic; some clear propositions about historical periodization; a robust 
specification of impacts; and some sound reflections about the trajectory of the process itself” [14] 
This is an example of criteria for theory acceptance that relies upon confirmation bias, 
avoiding scepticism. The bias against scepticism has as one consequence that such 
theories are too readily taken as guides to action, each suggesting that their “justified 
account of causal logic” maps to observed reality and so to action conceived in cause-
effect terms. This stance encourages recklessness.  
To build this argument, I frame it in terms of the need for researchers to treat 
ignorance4 and knowledge – knowability and unknowability - as a duality, as ready to 
report the one as the other. I attack the ‘belief in belief’ that underpins confirmation 
bias, and to do this I examine different knowledge production methods by looking at 
different sets of criteria for the acceptability of accounts.   
Palliative response 
This paper has some suggestions for how confirmation bias arises and how palliative 
responses may be emerging. Palliative here implies measures that mitigate or ease 
                                                 
4 In this paper I use the term ignorance to mean unknowable; alternative meanings are that it means not 
knowing that which can be, and perhaps should be, known. For me, then, the basic duality of 
ignorance/knowledge is that between knowability/unknowability.  
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costs, without actually solving the underlying problem; as the saying goes, ‘like a 
blood transfusion for Keith Richard’, it helps, but it does not solve the problem.  
Philosophy and a social epistemological lens 
It is perhaps self-evident that there is a difference between an account of something, 
and what that account might be said to be about. Distinguishing between the two is 
foundational to discussion of how things should be explained, predicted or whatever 
else an account is said to do. Indeed, a basic term we use to discuss accounts, that of 
the metaphor, etymologically links ‘model and muddle’ by suggesting that a model – 
a metaphorical account – must ‘bear’ or carry something across the gap between the 
two.5  
Students may confuse reality and accounts of reality, but they are taught and learn that 
this can be unwise. The utility of accounts of reality is evidently varied, but an 
important value of accounts is that they enable us to think in those terms, rather than 
having to experience what it is said they are about. The value of theory is thus 
precisely that it is not reality, but about it, although just what we mean by ‘about’ 
varies. Some people find it useful to consider that accounts can be true, others that the 
very notion of truth is confusing and confused. My main point here is that use of an 
account of reality to think about reality requires the account, which is unreal, to bear a 
burden of belief. Thus disbelief has to be suspended if the account is to be a 
                                                 
5 Thus most dictionaries tell us that the ‘phor’ in metaphor has the same etymological root as the 
second part of the two words euphoria and dysphoria, where reality is - respectively - happily or 
unhappily borne.  
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believable account of reality; put this way, the core issue here is the management of 
movements between belief and disbelief: how we manage accounts and their 
believability.  
How do we generate accounts of how belief and disbelief are managed, socially? One 
useful point of view here is that, as variation in how belief is managed is evident, we 
can think of this in terms of social variation in the acceptability of accounts. Any 
foray into discussions of economics, for example, will rapidly show variation in 
method, in what is acceptable in seminar rooms or to reviewers of papers, pleasing to 
funding agencies and so on. Furthermore, in that particular knowledge may have 
implications for action and practice, beliefs about belief map into different practices, 
so knowing about them helps explain what people do.   
For example, Hoffman, in a practitioner’s account of Prussian and later German 
military doctrine argues that:  
The importance of acting … results immediately from the characteristics of war. War is the domain 
of uncertainty, friction and, often, sheer chaos. … When the unexpected occurs, those waiting for 
new orders will lose. … auftragstaktik is one way to call forth … quick and independent action 
[Hoffman 1994:3] 
Hoffman offers an account of a practice – combat – and here reports that this practice 
asserts that belief that war is predictably regular is a mistake, and should be 
suspended: statements about reality in this context that assert their own predictive 
truth would not be accepted.  
To take another example, discussion of ways in which belief and disbelief are 
managed and constructed is often associated with analyses of science practice – 
specifically, those elements of normative practice that state what correct practice is. 
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Thus Crombie, in a study of the historical origins of science, focusses upon method or 
procedure: recognisable social practices said capable of producing knowledge within 
that practice:  
The history of science shows that the most striking changes are nearly always brought about by new 
conceptions of scientific procedure [Crombie 1953:1] 
Such conceptions of procedure reveal attitudes towards belief: here that better 
methods produce better statements about reality that should command acceptance and 
belief.  
Nisbet 1969, by contrast, offers an account of Western theories of development and 
social change. He concludes that this broad tradition has consistently over time 
applied certain criteria: accounts of change here (which he says have dominated 
Western thought) are not intended to map reality closely, but rather offer metaphorical 
accounts of the essential aspects of change.  
It is … however, the principal argument of this book that the metaphor … {is} much more than 
adornments of thought and language. {It is} quite inseparable from some of the profoundest 
currents in Western thought on society and change. They were inseparable in ancient Greek thought 
and in the thought of the centuries which followed the Greeks; and they remain closely involved in 
premises and preconceptions regarding the nature of change which we find in contemporary social 
theory [8, 9]  
By contrast, Crombie’s historical study shows the origins of what he calls modern 
Western natural science. He argues that Robert Grosseteste (c. 1168-1253) was the 
source of a “strategic act {that} ... created modern experimental science {by uniting} 
… the experiment habit of the practical arts with the rationalism of twelfth-century 
philosophy’ [10]. This -  
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took the double, inductive-deductive procedure described by Aristotle” [13] and built upon it to 
create a methodology that contributed to “the study of the relation between theory and experience, 
of the use of induction and experiment in scientific investigation, of the relation of mathematical to 
‘physical’ and metaphysical explanations, and of the problem of certainty in the study of the world 
through the senses [14] 
In Crombie’s account of Grosseteste’s reflections, however, two points stand out. 
First, the facts Grosseteste engaged with were the result of technological 
developments that were both considerable and largely free of underlying explanation 
– they were not theorised [White 1940]. The particular focus for Grosseteste was 
optics – in particular what was observed when light was guided through prisms – and 
this needed prisms and light sources created without theory. Second, that, as a cleric 
he both lived and worked in an environment permeated with belief that investigations 
were to do with the discovery of divine truth (“For in the Divine Mind all knowledge 
exists from eternity” Crombie:73 quoting Grosseteste). He believed that his theories, 
whose deductions he thought should be tested against evidence in the new scientific 
method he was founding, came from Divine illumination [131]. Thus it is not so 
surprising that he did not actually test his theories about optics empirically, which 
would have suggested, according to Crombie, that they were wrong [Crombie:124].  
There is a striking contrast between the different criteria reported by Nisbet and those 
reported by Crombie. An important difference is in the issue of possible convergence 
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and this illuminates what we mean by predictive power. 
 
Nisbet shows that the long-established criteria required for acceptance of 
metaphorical accounts of social change do not include any requirement that they be 
compared (see Box 1). 
By contrast, Crombie’s account of natural science method argues that the requirement 
of predictability, based upon deduction from theory derived from induction, requires 
different accounts to be compared. This implies that prediction can be thought of as a 
criterion internal to a knowledge creation practice that requires comparison between 
knowledges, which, if interactions with data support theory, leads to convergence. By 
contrast the criteria Nisbet reports lack such a criterion, suited to a world of multiple 
truths.  
In re-examining auftragstaktik we thus find an example that requires belief that 
relevant reality is chaotic and unpredictable; Hoffman reports a situation where 
experts are required to suspend belief in the predictability of war (officers on training 
courses would fail if they asserted otherwise). In contrasting Nisbet with Crombie we 
Box 1: Nisbet’s seven criteria 
“From the metaphor came the {first} notion of change as natural to each and every living 
entity, social as well as biological, as something as much a part of its nature as structure and 
process. Second, social change – that is, natural change, was regarded as immanent, as 
proceeding from forces or provisions within the entity. Third, change, under this view is 
continuous, which is to say that change may be conceived as manifesting itself in sequential 
stages which have genetic relation to one another; they are cumulative. Fourth, change is 
directional; it can be seen as a single process moving cumulatively from a given point in 
time to another point’ Fifth, change is necessary; it is necessary because it is natural, because 
it is as much an attribute of a living thing as is form or substance. Sixth, change in society 
corresponds to differentiation; its characteristic pattern is from the homogenous to the 
heterogeneous. Seventh, the change that is natural to an entity is the result of uniform 
processes; processes which inhere in the very structure of the institution of culture, and 
which may be assumed to have been the same yesterday as they are today” [212, underlining 
added] 
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learn how social norms involved in knowledge production may or may not contain a 
criterion to govern convergence. We may conclude that this is what prediction is all 
about: to understand, say, engineering theory it is far less necessary to understand 
factors outside the practice than, say, economics, and whilst the former is reliant upon 
predictive power, the latter clearly is not [Yonay 1998; Fforde 2013].  
To recapitulate, statements of suitable method going back to Grosseteste (in 
Crombie’s account) require movement between the inductive and deductive; between 
theorisation and confrontation of deductions from theory with facts. Since theory is 
not reality, but some account of it, disbelief is suspended to give suitable meaning to 
theorisation (‘to theorise, you have to believe in your theory’). This allows 
theorisation to engage with facts (not yet predictively), for belief in the possible value 
and validity of theory encourages theorisation, just as it encourages confirmation bias.  
The distinction between induction, when theory is developed to match facts, and 
deduction, when theory is used to deduce assertions about reality – predictions - that 
can then be tested empirically, is the core of this. Crombie’s point is that Grosseteste 
added empirical testing to a far older view (and procedure) which asserted how 
knowledge was to be created (that is, that the right criteria to apply to assess a 
candidate for knowledge creation) as psychological powers (nous) showed the theorist 
the path forward.  
Underpinning method, though, is belief that there is something knowable: that there is 
something present in reality that makes theorisation viable. Applying Nisbet’s criteria, 
this is simply production of an empirically-founded metaphorical account meeting the 
criteria. Applying Crombie’s, theory must be predictively powerful. Obviously, there 
is no a priori reason to expect theory in a particular context to be able to do either of 
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these things: the data may not exhibit suitable regularities and/or the theorist may lack 
whatever it takes. Theorisation may thus fail, but in these two accounts fail for very 
different reasons.  
In Crombie’s framing, the shift between induction and deduction is a shift between 
suspension of disbelief and its reinstatement. The obvious risk is that, belief in theory 
having being encouraged during the induction phase, belief may not then be 
suspended as the deductive moment requires. Therefore, it is permitted to believe in 
the truth of theory in the inductive phase, but the normative criteria are violated if the 
researcher does not suspend this belief as they deduce testable predictions. This starts 
to look like a story about confirmation bias.  
One can think of an ‘inductive box’ into which theory-making must be put for it to 
then re-emerge so that theory can drive deduction and empirical engagement, to seek 
and (perhaps or perhaps not) gain status as more than ‘just theory’.6 In these terms, 
Grosseteste, his theorising soul warmed by proximity to his God (or so he believed) 
did not get out of the inductive box. Confirmation bias can be seen as the tendency to 
stay within the inductive box, which, as Crombie’s history shows, was there very 
                                                 
6 Here I avoid using the term ‘inductive trap’ as that may suggest that I am referring to the wide range 
of discussions, often associated with Hume, about whether solely inductive reasoning may or may not 
lead to truth. It should be obvious from my approach here, which views epistemological matters as 
inseparable from social practices, that I mean something quite different. By ‘inductive box’ I mean that 
first stage of the quite orthodox idea of the “double, inductive-deductive procedure” where, before 
theory is used deductively to produce testable statements, theory is developed, in some relation to its 
‘other’ – a reality, perhaps – which is to do with ‘induction’, and whilst it is being developed has to be 
kept isolated, and I call this being ‘in a box’ – the ‘inductive box’.  
15 
 
early on. Improved method here must therefore assert the value of scepticism. It must 
be socially acceptable, in terms of normative procedure, to believe that the particular 
context is unknowable (as crack propagation speed is, in terms of theorisation of 
cause and effect).  
The analysis offers two insights:  
• First, that predictability is a criterion within some but not all knowledge 
practices that requires comparison of theories, and pushes for convergence; 
• Second, that the acceptability of non-predictive accounts is related to the 
shared criteria they meet (Nisbet’s), which have a very long historical 
foundation and are fundamentally metaphorical, concerned to offer an 
account of the essential aspects of what the account is about and meet criteria 
that allow co-existence of multiple truths.7  
Only if the data will carry it, and the theory created is good enough, will accounts add 
predictive power; otherwise, if we follow Nisbet and Crombie we expect that 
accounts meet only those criteria required of metaphorical accounts, and pressure for 
convergence lie outside the knowledge practice’s own method. In a tolerant 
environment, perhaps they will exist in a world of multiple truths; if not, perhaps the 
Prince will decide on the truth of the matter.    
                                                 
7 Although I do not develop the argument here, the essentialist nature of theories of social change in 
Nisbet’s account can be taken to imply that their terms do not have determinate meanings, viewed 
epistemically. Does this imply that such accounts necessarily entail ontological instability, so that for 
their accompanying statistical empirics sampling cannot be said to be from a single population, so that 
results are necessarily spurious?  
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Contemporary social science  
Action and predictive social theory 
The validity of a theory as a guide to action, when it has not been tested deductively, 
appears often to be high.8 Consider Dunn 2000:  
In the case of the massive impetus towards economic liberalisation of the last two decades of the 
twentieth century . . .  it is natural to see this [as] the discovery of ever clearer and more reliable 
techniques for fostering economic efficiency . . .  
This is very much the way in which a whole generation of economists actively engaged in public 
service have come to view it, just as their Keynesian predecessors a generation or so earlier saw the 
previous move in a roughly opposite direction. Viewed epistemologically, however, the sequence 
looks strikingly different.  . . .  [I]t was the increasingly evident falsity of one set of false beliefs, 
not the steadily growing epistemic authority of their replacements, which did most of the work. . . .  
The clear result is the negative result. [184–185] 
The sense of negative here is that the hoped-for predictive power of what was 
replaced had been found to be absent (policy ‘had not worked’). Though, recall that 
Nisbet concluded that Western theories of social change are judged by a range of 
criteria that do not include predictive power (see Box 1). Their relationship to reality, 
in a long historical tradition, is metaphorical. Such theories of social change, when, 
                                                 
8 What is meant here by ‘tested deductively’ follows the sense of the Aristotelian procedure of 
movement between induction and deduction, modified by Grosseteste to require that deductions be 
confronted with empirical testing. If chosen logical rules are followed, then the deductions from a 
given theory are true as logical deductions, premised upon the truth of whatever they rest on – they are 
relatively true; what is meant here, though, is that such deductions can be also be considered as untrue 
and their plausibility to be assessed empirically.  
17 
 
for example, they say that policy X will cause Y, are necessarily (unless by chance) 
bad guides to action.  
Now, it is evident that belief that such social theories map easily to reality, in effect 
predictively, is nevertheless common [Friedman 2006 reflecting on Converse 1964]. 
Yet whilst metaphorical accounts in Nisbet’s sense have empirical foundations, these 
are not predictive, and should not be expected to be so, given the contrasts between 
the different criteria of the different methods Nisbet and Crombie report.  
Consider a recent development in philosophy: ‘agnotology’ – the ‘study of 
ignorance’. This easily becomes the study, not of situations where there is suspension 
of belief in possible theory - a choice to believe in ignorance as unknowability - but 
rather where ignorance is seen when true knowledge is possible but obscured or 
prevented by the presence of an untrue set of beliefs.9 Confirmation bias is present 
here, as the focus entails belief in knowability, and the issue in agnotology is to 
examine how knowability is stymied. Scepticism is devalued.  
Weiss 2012 thus builds upon others’ work to examine agnotology mainly as “how 
real-world facts can be manipulated or ignorance actually generated when information 
is distorted by obscured by special interests, as exemplified by tobacco companies’ 
fight to prevent the evil leaf from being controlled …” [96]. He goes beyond this to 
pose what he calls “the agnotological question: How can we convey what we do not 
know?” [96].   
                                                 
9 Ignorance then means not knowing something that is knowable, which is not the general meaning I 
use in this paper generally. 
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Consider also the now common tendency to stress that truth is a social construct, 
‘useful’ and seen as supportive of certain (knowable) social situations. In such 
approaches policy, for example, is viewed mainly as a way for social organisations to 
cohere, rather than as a means to attain predictively known ends [Shore and Wright 
1997]. Thus Sullivan 2012, after a discussion of what she calls ‘Truth’ junkies in UK 
public policy, quotes Foucault as arguing that “we cannot exercise power except 
through the production of truth” [510]. She concludes herself that “the manifestation 
of evaluation as regulation … is an apt reflection of the way in which truth is 
constituted and described” [510].  
If we look at Weiss and Sullivan, just what acceptability or truth criteria apply to 
these statements, and are they the same? Clearly not – if we ask the question ‘are 
these statements themselves true (or ‘apt’, to use Sullivan’s synonym, or ‘genuine’, to 
use Weiss’) there is no clear answer other than that the two authors clearly imply a 
range of answers. Both remain within their inductive boxes, asserting the validity of 
what they write. Their work is not without empirical foundation, but their methods do 
not follow Crombie’s procedure or method. It is striking how they follow those listed 
by Nisbet (see Box 1 above). As such, there is no way within the method to compare 
them; we have multiple truths.  
The risk is clear: accounts following Nisbet’s criteria are metaphorical accounts of 
reality, containing references to facts, to causes and to effects. Arguing that they are 
stuck within inductive boxes says that they are insufficiently sceptical, and too ready 
to suggest that their accounts, their “justified account of causal logic” [Held et al 14], 
map predictively to reality. This I believe is profoundly unwise, as did Prussian and 
German generals when they required their subordinate officers to adopt a sceptical 
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position – to act as though their context was chaotic. Policy as just metaphor is 
advisedly not used as a guide to action where cause is predictably meant to be linked 
to effect.  
In the next section I use the case of econometric growth analysis to offer an account 
of what may happen as researchers chose to ignore scepticism, and remain in their 
inductive boxes when research suggests strongly that their data does not support their 
beliefs - in this example, in published academic work.10 They continued to suspend 
disbelief, preserving belief in their theories.  
Relevant here are two canonical discussions from inside the discipline – Solow 1956 
and a Symposium organized by the World Bank [World Bank Economic Review 
2001]. Solow argued that whilst –  
All theory depends on assumptions which are not quite true. That is what makes it theory. The art of 
successful theorizing is to make the inevitable simplifying assumptions in such a way that the final 
results are not very sensitive [65] 
The paper has no empirical referents linked to the algebra deployed. His reference to 
“final results” is thus a remark about the theory, not its relationship to reality: it is a 
remark about the effects of variation in the algebraic formulation of the issue upon the 
results of the model in terms of the model alone: his article, seminal in the field, 
reports on theorizing.  
                                                 
10 It would be easy but is not really necessary to present historical examples of application of allegedly 
predictively known economic relationships to policy, with poor results; recent ones would be the Asian 
Financial Crisis, the Global Financial Crisis and austerity policies.   
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Two generations later, at the World Bank Symposium, organized by an institution 
committed to the idea that it had expertise in knowing how to change rates of 
economic growth, Solow stated: 
I have been skeptical from the beginning about the interpretation of cross-country growth 
regressions [283] 
Other contributors to the collection argued in terms of knowable but incomplete 
knowledge. After decades of research, no predictive knowledge had been found, yet 
theory, despite the scepticism of a key creator of it, remained valued as a basis for 
action - for policy advice. And, as I discuss in the next section, what is striking is the 
methodological inability to accept ignorance in the sense of their being nothing to 
know: unknowability. 
The cross-country growth regressions literature: 
research as guide to action?  
This paper arose originally from an interest in understanding belief in the knowability 
of change processes, in terms of cause-effect relations and the predictive viability of 
policy advice (that X will lead to Y), especially in the field of international 
development.11 Econometric cross-country growth studies therefore purport to look 
                                                 
11 This field is a very useful case study, suggesting that confirmation bias is deeply-rooted in 
mainstream governance practices [Fforde 2015] that assume a relative power over other poorer regions 
that is arguably absent [Seidel and Fforde 2015]. It can be argued that economists are particularly at 
risk, as their theoretical priors are particularly strong, perhaps compared with other disciplines such as 
anthropologists and sociologists. See Fourcade 2015 for a discussion. In the terms used in this paper 
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for reliable evidence for the causes of differing economic growth performance. 
However, examination will easily show a plethora of published but contradictory 
results: there is no apparent convergence, and this is a stable characteristic of the 
literature.  
In this literature, lack of convergence in turn generated empirical investigation. 
Levine & Zervos 1993 applied techniques called formal robustness tests to a dataset 
typical of those used in the cross-country growth studies. They concluded that, based 
on their method, there existed extremely few – almost no - robust relations between 
economic growth and policy proxy variables. This challenged common beliefs both 
amongst consumers of policy advice and economic researchers that economics 
generates knowably reliable results in terms of known causes and effects. Fforde 2005 
examined citations of Levine & Zervos and found the majority of those citing the 
study in various ways ignored this challenge: specifically, most authors did not move 
from belief that what causes growth is knowable and known with perhaps some 
uncertainty (whatever that particular belief may actually be in a particular place and 
time).  
However, some authors did take on board the possibility that the data could be 
interpreted as advising that the situation was unknowable in its own terms. Kenny and 
Williams 2001 argued that it told us that the research was assuming ontological 
universalism – sampling from a single population – so that the evidence was 
                                                                                                                                            
and in Fforde 2016 forthcoming, economists are more inclined to be trapped in an ‘inductive box’, 
failing to return to disbelief in theory and adopt a skepticism as deductions from it are confronted with 
data.  
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suggesting that cause-effect relations between policies and economic performance 
were unknowable in the terms of the dataset. GDP here and GDP there were 
essentially different, but theory assumed they were not. This supported (though 
amongst only a minority) a sceptical position, mitigating the general tendency to 
confirmation bias. Thus Wood (1994): 
The value of this message is clear… None of us…will ever rely so casually and so heavily upon 
cross-country regressions. … I have a basic reservation about the methodology used … [67-8, 
quoted in Fforde 2005:74] 
But the stance of the majority appears, in the terms I use above, as an example of a 
maintained suspension of disbelief – an inability to move, in the “double, inductive-
deductive procedure” from the inductive box, where models are driven by a 
suspension of disbelief (belief that what is unreal is true), to a deductive stage when 
models are used to generate predictions and assessed empirically. The suspension of 
disbelief, here, becomes an empirically unwarranted belief in the soundness of the 
model as a predictably valid theory. Here the method used can be seen as a failure to 
follow a standard scientific methodology with its “double, inductive-deductive 
procedure”. Clearly, the literature, published in high-status journals, follows rules for 
what is accepted as valid theories of social change (with this understood as economic 
growth), and also clearly the results are meant to be used to say that X will lead to Y.  
So what methodology are they following? What are the truth criteria being applied? It 
seems clear that Nisbet rather than Crombie offers a better guide.  
Economic theories about change are algebraic in form and contain variables that refer 
to time – ‘t’. This is readily interpreted as meaning that the theory is potentially 
predictive. Equally clearly, however, the criteria applied are not those that seek 
23 
 
predictive power. Economists engage with data in fairly rigorous ways, but their 
theories do not generate predictive power and it seems are not intended to, as their 
method does not require it. To quote researchers looking at what economists do when 
they model [Yonay and Breslau 2006]: 
What is distinctive about model-building in economics is the process that mediates between the 
microworld [the economic models] and the ostensible object of the research. Rather than involving 
scientific instruments or data-gathering procedures, this mediation is accomplished by vaguely 
defined but generally accepted conventions regarding the movement from reality to models. . . . 
There is no pretence that the model actually resembles reality. Rather, the concern with realism is a 
concern with the plausibility of the mediation between the reality and the model. [33–34] 
The majority of economists stress the importance of a model’s being based upon 
rigorous statements of the nature of, and the modelling implied by, their 
understanding of and belief in rational behaviour. From a Crombian perspective, there 
is nothing remarkable here - this is simply the chosen theoretical framework. A 
model, however motivated, that does not appear founded on such statements is 
therefore not highly valued; and the discipline - again unremarkably - polices its 
statements about reality by reference to such boundaries.12  
Econometrics has a capacity to deal with vast volumes of data and create a sense, 
within the inductive box, of what patterns can be found. The basic theory assessed by 
                                                 
12 I am generalising, yet Yonay 1998 offers an intriguing historical account of what happened within 
the discipline in the 1930s when data became available to confront theory. He argues that ‘those who 
won’ tended to continue to believe that data was not very important to their belief in theory. Economics 
textbooks often assert the value of theory to students without much engagement with data [Fforde 
2013].  
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econometrics remains a conceptual model of ‘equations plus error term’, with what I 
see as the underlying assumption, in some practices required, that the model be 
assumed true for the estimation to be legitimate (see the quote from Cohen above). 
This is highly evocative of the essentialism Nisbet reports as a long-established 
characteristic of Western theories of social change, if not Plato’s metaphor of the 
shadows on the walls of the cave.  
Econometrics can thus be viewed as set up to estimate the parameters of an economic 
model assumed true; that is, if changes in X lead to changes in Y, as the model states, 
econometrics statistically estimates how much. Now, if the model is assumed true, it 
is clear that there will be tangles if statistical estimates of parameters are not 
significantly different from zero. Again, all this fits a view of theorisation within the 
‘inductive box’. To quote McCloskey:  
The question of whether prices are closely connected internationally, then, is important. The official 
rhetoric does not leave much doubt as to what is required to answer it: collect facts on prices … and 
test the hypothesis. A large number of economists have done this. Half of them conclude that 
purchasing power parity works; the other half conclude that it fails. The conclusions diverge not 
because economics is arbitrary but because the disputants have not considered their statistical 
rhetoric [1985: 109—111].  
She argues that many economic arguments confuse judgments about economic 
significance with judgments about statistical significance. As she puts it: 
The numbers are necessary material. But they are not sufficient to bring the matter to a scientific 
conclusion. Only the scientists can do that, because “conclusion” is a human idea, not Nature’s. It is 
a property of human minds, not of the statistics. [112] 
And: 
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It is not true, as most economists think, that . . . statistical significance is a preliminary screen, a 
necessary condition, through which empirical estimates should be put. Economists will say, “Well, 
I want to know if the coefficient exists, don’t I?” Yes, but statistical significance can’t tell you. 
Only the magnitude of the coefficient, on the scale of what counts in practical, engineering terms as 
nonzero, tells you. It is not the case that statistically insignificant coefficients are in effect zero. 
[118] 
These arguments are suggestive. Centrally, as comparison between Nisbettian and 
Crombian criteria showed, the method of the former, unlike the latter, gives no way to 
decide between competing theories. This has to be dealt with outside the method. It is 
then made easier to report the finding of patterns, for different patterns may 
legitimately be found in the same data: a world of multiple truths. And this is just 
what we find in the cross-country growth econometrics.    
We can add to this. For example, it is a knowable result in econometrics that the 
results of estimations can be spurious, in the sense that, for reasons to do with the 
nature of assumptions held to be true to generate them, they are best treated as neither 
true nor false, but empty of meaning. Granger 1990 and Granger and Newbold 1974 
report positive correlations between variables derived from sets of random numbers. 
Patterns can be found using these methods where none exist.  
I conclude that researchers may be thought of as treating belief asymmetrically: rather 
than choice between ignorance and knowledge – knowability and unknowability - 
being seen (and method requiring it be seen) as necessary, the socially normative 
focus (the method used) is upon the acquisition of knowledge, albeit perhaps with a 
degree of uncertainty associated with it. In the inductive box, whilst theorising, belief 
is needed; for Nisbet, viewed from a Crombie perspective, this is the end of it, for 
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there is no criterion requiring any more to be done: in a nutshell, method entails 
confirmation bias. This would seem to be the case for any knowledge production 
process that lacks a criterion equivalent to prediction that requires comparison 
between accounts, and which, following Nisbet, is metaphorical.  
What the growth literature case study shows us is therefore, first, that most 
practitioners do not question these assumptions, though they could. The issue is one 
of method; method can be changed, but it is not. I now develop an argument based 
upon existing statistical methodologies that offers a conceptual test for whether it is 
wise to believe that there is a knowable order, and so to step into the inductive box. 
This is a method for judging whether the data supports this or not. This offers an 
operationalization of the idea that ignorance and knowledge are part of a duality, so, 
as choice between them is inevitable, it is a good idea to work out how to manage it. It 
seems, though, that the cultural and one could say metaphysical predilections are 
towards belief in knowability, in the presence of a knowable order, so that such 
suggestions are not likely to be more than palliative. Whether this particular method is 
a good one or not, though, the point stands: in terms of procedure, it is a good idea to 
better manage pressure for confirmation bias by supporting in principle judgements of 
ignorance – of unknowability in particular contexts. There should be a right to 
scepticism.  
How to avoid the inductive box?  
Most statistical work, including that used in the growth economics literature, develops 
methods familiar from statistical hypothesis testing. Based upon a set of assumptions, 
an estimated value of a variable has an associated estimated probability distribution. 
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Thus, within certain limits and based upon certain assumptions, the researcher can 
make a judgement about the relationship between the estimated value of the variable 
and the population value that would be measured if the entire population were 
surveyed. These certain limits and assumptions include some metric that helps the 
researcher reach a conclusion and this is probably the familiar confidence level (5%, 
10%). More generally, such procedures contain a ‘hurdle’, which is in integral part of 
the method by which the researcher draws their conclusions.  
The quote from Cohen 1984 given above suggests that a researcher must predicate the 
truth of any conclusion upon the assumption that certain things are true. There must 
be confidence of enough regularity in the data to justify theorisation. More 
importantly for the argument here, researchers in practice assume that the confidence 
level is a given, conventionally at the 5% or 10% level.  
Now, one can ask, for the given statistical procedure, an inverse question, which is at 
which confidence level should a researcher conclude that because there is not enough 
regularity in the data (robust relations between cause and effect variables) they should 
not try to theorise: they should be able to assert that any reality ‘behind the data’ is 
too unknowable. This question is not usually asked, is not part of standard procedure, 
and the choice is not guided empirically. Such choice can, however, be guided by the 
following considerations.   
In the limited bounds robustness-testing techniques, such that used by Levine & 
Zervos, and in the application of Bayesian techniques [Fforde & Parker 2012], 
researchers’ practices can be seen in different ways deploying a hurdle to permit them 
to gauge whether they should conclude that a relationship exists. The placing of this 
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hurdle is not a property either of the data or of the model proposed. So we can ask the 
inverse question: for each practice, and dataset, at which hurdle height should a 
researcher report no known relationship to exist.  
Researchers conventionally do not ask this question, which appears in part to be 
because of the assumption that knowledge – knowability - is, not part of a dual 
containing ignorance – unknowability - but a truth that researchers assume they may 
know, and whose parameters are to be estimated empirically, albeit with a degree of 
uncertainty.  In other words it is assumed that theorisation is always worthwhile; by 
entering the inductive box (theorising) it has already been assumed, in this social 
practice, that there is a pattern to be found. If there is evidence (as we found in Levine 
& Zervos) that this is not the case, this is easily rejected and the choice made to 
maintain suspension of disbelief and assertion that the model works.  
In the robustness testing techniques applied by Levine & Zervos, the hurdle is a given 
confidence limit used to gauge whether relationships between exogenous variables 
and others are as desired. 
If we change the hurdle value to make it harder to find results, fewer results are found. 
Obviously we can then find the value at which there are (just) no robust relations. 
This then a valuable characteristic of the dataset, and we call this the Paine Index. The 
level of the Paine Index can be used to tell researchers whether there is adequate 
regularity in the dataset to justify theorisation – to getting into the inductive box.  
What Hoffman is saying about auftragstaktik is equivalently that, based upon what 
they knew about war, the Paine Index or some equivalent was found to be at a level 
that implied that “War is the domain of uncertainty, friction and, often, sheer chaos.” 
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By contrast, datasets about iron smelting or crack propagation speed (see above) 
would generate values justifying theorisation as these were, on the contrary, domains 
of order and relative certainty.  
Confirmation bias and belief in revelatory knowledge 
Gillespie 2008 (quoted above) is like Nisbet a study of the history of ideas 
fundamental to Western culture, stressing the destructive effects upon various 
certainties of philosophical debates of the fourteenth century and the importance of 
these debates when considering modern ideas of progress and the advance of 
knowledge. Like Nisbet Gillespie sees cultural patterns. In the quote above Gillespie 
is focusing upon Western populations that have largely abandoned organized religious 
practice. In these particular religious practices, divinity is associated with the absence 
of contingency: with situations where meaning can be determinate, ‘God-given’ and 
revelatory – that is, that truth as Word can be knowable by us as humans, given divine 
intervention and/or presence (Grosseteste’s ‘Divine Illumination’).  
For contemporary social scientists such as economists studying data on variations in 
economic growth across countries and regions, belief in the validity of regression 
results based upon assumptions of ontological universalism plausibly reflects this 
legacy [Kenny & Williams 2001]. The evidence for the absence of regularities that we 
find in Levine & Zervos was probably obvious to statisticians once the datasets were 
available (through the 1970s, if not earlier), yet the analysis of citations of that article  
in Fforde 2005 shows a majority holding to their beliefs. These beliefs entail implicit 
choices about ontological stability that include beliefs that terms such as GDP, export-
oriented growth policies and inflation have determinate meanings. As we have also 
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seen, these beliefs flew in the face of evidence [Levine & Zervos 1993], in Crombian 
terms, and fit far more easily into Nisbet’s criteria (Box 1). And, as we have also seen, 
at the historical birth of modern empirical scientific method, according to Crombie, 
Grosseteste, despite endorsing the method, did not actually test his theories about 
optics and, had he done so, he would have likely discarded them [Crombie:124]. For 
Grosseteste, suspension of disbelief during his theoretical ponderings was associated 
with his belief in Divine Illumination.  
Gillespie’s remarks offer a path into a conceptual discussion of the duality of 
ignorance and knowledge – knowability and unknowability - that is I think too often 
implicit in empirical practice. It offers a way to understand (and so better to deal with) 
how what I am calling the suspension of disbelief is powered and driven by belief in 
belief, which in my terms makes it too easy for practitioners to avoid the “double, 
inductive-deductive procedure” and remain in the inductive box. As is familiar from 
many areas, including international development practice [Fforde 2009, 2013], people 
appear very often to believe that what they happen to believe is true, and are happy 
with this despite evidence pointing the other way. They like confirmation bias despite 
the risks. This seems to be in part because the norms of their method give them 
reasons to believe in their theories and continue to believe in them as true, thus 
continuing to suspend disbelief in them (for they are but theories).  
Yet a minority of the citations of Levine & Zervos reported in Fforde 2005 can be 
understood as shifting towards more sceptical ways of doing research, and so it 
appears that there is some hope that the effects of confirmation bias can be mitigated, 
even if its origins are so culturally-deep that a cure is far away.  
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Conclusions  
My discussion of the nature of the conceptual underpinnings of empirical work 
suggests that framing judgements in terms of a duality of ignorance and knowledge 
informs us about how we may better manage belief. The core issue is how, when we 
fear we may lack predictive knowledge, we manage method. The Paine Index – or 
some equivalent - offers a tool to include in method to assess whether it is 
worthwhile, for a give dataset, to assume knowledge or ignorance, and so to avoid 
theorising. More generally, it shows how method can be changed to include a 
judgement that there is not enough regularity to justify suspending disbelief in theory 
and entering the inductive box.   
We do not escape from our choices by privileging – by accepting confirmation bias - 
the acquisition of knowledge compared with the acceptance of ignorance. This is, I 
have argued, to choose to put ourselves in an inductive box and preserve a suspension 
of disbelief that is meant to be only temporary. It seems better to improve ways of 
avoiding the inductive box.  With much policy guided by claims to predictive power, 
and where choices to believe are usually implicit, we risk much when our method of 
knowledge production include choices about what to believe that we are too often 
unaware of. Without realising this, in many areas of applied research it is too hard to 
assert ignorance, and behave in whatever ways suit that, and too easy to assert 
knowledge; this is risky and can be reckless and so unethical – and those seen as 
unethical risk loosing prestige and authority [1990, 1997].  
Melbourne 2016 
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